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CONTRIBUTION AND CLAIM REDUCTION
IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION:
A LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
DONALD J. POLDEN*
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN**
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Texas Industries v. Radcliff
Materials affirmed the common law rule against contribution among an-
titrust defendants, and left congressional action as the only avenue for
those seeking to allow contribution. In this Article, Professors Polden and
Sullivan examine the relevant legislation proposed in the last two Con-
gresses in light of the policies underlying the antitrust laws. They conclude
that a contribution rule, if adopted by Congress, should apply only to
offenses subject to a rule of reason analysis and that contribution shares
should be determined by standards more flexible than those of market
share analysis. The authors believe that the trial judge in antitrust cases
should have discretion over whether or not to conduct a jury trial. Finally,
they suggest that legislation in this area should not be applied
retroactively.
The right to contribution among antitrust defendants is a con-
troversial issue in antitrust litigation. Because a plaintiff can
choose to recover all his damages from a single defendant,'
notwithstanding the possible existence of other, perhaps more
culpable defendants, the absence of a contribution rule means
that the sued defendant may pay damage judgments far in excess
of his responsibility, while other responsible parties escape lia-
bility. The enactment of a contribution rule would remedy this
unfairness by permitting the paying defendant to distribute a
portion of his liability among his coconspirators. A claim reduc-
tion rule would extend this result to settlements in multidefen-
dant cases. The outstanding damage claim would be reduced by
a settling defendant's contribution share so that this settlement
*Professor of Law, Drake University. B.B.A., The George Washington University,
1970; J.D., Indiana University, 1975.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Columbia. B.A., Drake University, 1970;
J.D., Indiana University, 1973.
The authors express their appreciation to Dean Richard Calkins of the Drake Uni-
versity Law School and Professor John J. Quinn of the Osgoode Hall Law School for
their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts and to Patricia Stegmaier of Drake University
Law School and James Burt of the University of Missouri Law School for their capable
research assistance. Errors, if any, are the authors' responsibility.
'See, e.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir.
1963).
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would not leave the remaining defendants liable for more than
their shares.
These arguments convinced the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit to adopt a contribution rule in 1979.2
During the same year, Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) introduced
a pro-contribution provision as part of Senate Bill S. 390, enti-
tled the "Antitrust Improvements Act of 1979. ' '3 The contribu-
tion provision was withdrawn from S. 390 and later introduced
as a separate contribution bill, S. 1468. 4 While this proposal was
being considered by the Senate, the Supreme Court held that
no right of contribution existed under the antitrust laws.5
Congressional action therefore became the only available mech-
anism for the creation of a contribution right.
In response to the Supreme Court decision, the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary held hearings in 1981 and early 1982,6
and a new pro-contribution bill, S. 995,7 was reported out of
committee by a twelve to six vote on March 31, 1982. The
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
also considered several bills concerning contribution and claim
reduction, including bills that were very similar to S. 995.8 None
of these bills were passed during the Ninety-seventh Congress,
but S. 995 already has been reintroduced in the Ninety-eighth
Congress as S. 380, 9 and H.R. 2244 recently was introduced in
the House Judiciary Committee.' 0
2Professional Beauty Supply v. National Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
3S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
4S. 1468, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
-Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
For a discussion of the merits of a contribution rule, see generally Easterbrook,
Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331 (1980); Floyd, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators:
A Question of Legal Process, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183; Jacobson, Contribution Among
Antitrust Defendants: A Necessary Solution To A Recurring Problem, 32 U. FLA. L.
REV. 217 (1980); Polinsky & Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Anti-
trust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1981); Sullivan, New
Perspectives in Antitrust Litigation: Towards A Right of Comparative Contribution,
1980 U. ILL. L.F. 389.6The Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1981-1982).
7S. 995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
"For example, three bills were introduced in the House in the first session of the
Ninety-seventh Congress: H.R. 1242, H.R. 4072, and H.R. 5794. As discussed in Sec-
tion II, some of these bills represent ongoing efforts to gain passage of legislation like
S. 1468 and S. 995, while other bills represent independent efforts to resolve legislatively
critical issues concerning contribution and claim reduction in antitrust cases.
9S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
"°H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1983) ("Antitrust Fairness Amendments of
1983") (adding a new section 4J to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)), reprinted
in 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1107, at 673 (Mar. 24, 1983).
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The premise of this Article is that the thoughtful consideration
of the values underlying antitrust law and practice will dictate
proper legislative choices in the composition of contribution and
claim reduction legislation. Section I will summarize the courts'
treatment of contribution rights in antitrust cases. The tradi-
tional rule holding that antitrust defendants had no right to
contribution was challenged recently in the Eighth Circuit, but
was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. In Section II, the legis-
lative proposals offered in the current and prior Congresses will
be examined. Section III will develop the concerns underlying
antitrust law--deterrence, compensation, complexity, and fair-
ness-in the contribution context. Section IV will analyze the
legislative proposals discussed in Section II. Specifically, the
authors will discuss the provisions of the bills that concern the
coverage of the contribution right, the computation of contri-
bution shares, claim reduction, the jury trial right, and the ret-
roactiveapplicability of the statute. The conclusion will present
the authors' resolution of these issues and a model statute.
I. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT'S
The first federal court to consider contribution between anti-
trust tortfeasors was the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert." Shubert filed a third-
party complaint which alleged that the third-party defendant was
responsible for the damages suffered by Goldlawr. The court
ruled that the two conspiracies were separate and distinct and
concluded that Shubert and the impleaded third-party defendant
were not joint tortfeasors. In reaching this decision, the court
opined in dictum that the federal common law did not provide
a right of contribution between antitrust tortfeasors.12
The first United States court of appeals to hold that a right to
contribution did exist under the antitrust laws was the Eighth
Circuit in Professional Beauty Supply v. National Beauty Sup-
ply. 3 Several district courts previously had decided the issue
11276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960).
12 d. at 616. But compare Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert with Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394
F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968), a personal injury action predicated on a negligence theory,
where the Third Circuit adopted a comparative fault contribution rule. The Goldlawr
court observed that there was "no longer a legitimate place in our system, if indeed,
there ever was, for a rule of law which places the full burden of restitution upon one
who is only in part responsible for a plaintiff's loss." Id. at 467.
13594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
1983] 399
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directly to the contrary.' 4 The defendants in Professional Beauty
filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution. The district
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
reversed and required contribution by the third-party antitrust
defendant. The court, in a two to one decision, reasoned that
both deterrence and fairness dictated the adoption of a contri-
bution rule. 15
The Professional Beauty court was persuaded that a no-con-
tribution rule could reduce the deterrent effect of the antitrust
laws by allowing violators to escape liability. The possibility of
escaping liability was perceived by the court to be greatest in
situations where a plaintiff is so dependent on a violator that
the plaintiff chooses not to sue that potential defendant for fear
of retaliation by the violator, and instead sues other, relatively
less powerful defendants.' 6 This is likely to arise when the par-
ties are in a vertical relationship. Apart from its concern about
the deterrent effect of the existing law, the court objected to the
misallocation of damages caused by the absence of a contribu-
tion rule.' 7
While noting the significance of the deterrence and fairness
concerns in the case before it, the court conceded that such
equitable considerations would not exist in every case. Accord-
ingly, it left the decision on whether to use the contribution rule
to the discretion of the trier of fact.18 This discretion was to be
exercised in light of the relative bargaining power of the wrong-
doers and the extent of their participation in the illegal conduct.19
Each defendant's contribution portion was to be calculated on
a pro rata basis, with each violator bearing an equal share of
the damage liability.20
1
4Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,698 (D. Utah
1977), aff'd, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir. 1979); El Camino Glass v.
Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines, 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Washington v.
American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (S.D. Cal.), mandamus denied,
393 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 842 (1968).
'-Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1185-86.
16During depositions in Professional Beauty, the principal shareholders of plaintiff
"stated that they were persuaded not to name [an additional defendant] because of [its]
decision to renew Professional's franchise." Id. at 1185.
171d. at 1185-86.
181d. at 1186. The court did not specify whether the determination was to be made by
the judge or by the jury.
191d. at 1186.
20Id. at 1182 & n.4.
400
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The discretionary contribution approach of Professional
Beauty was rejected by every other court that considered the
issue.2' The principal argument against a contribution approach
was articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Wilson P. Abraham Con-
struction Corp. v. Texas Industries.22 That court concluded that
a contribution rule would dilute the deterrent effect of the an-
titrust law. Support for this conclusion was drawn from the
economic theory of risk aversion. This theory suggests that
business decisionmakers "are deterred more by the slight pros-
pect of a large loss than by the prospect of a small loss. ' '23 The
court, therefore, reasoned that a no-contribution approach, be-
cause it increases the size of the potential liability, would pro-
duce greater deterrence. The fairness issue arose in the context
of a claim that a no-contribution rule violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by making the sued defendant responsible for the
damages caused by others. The court rejected this argument,
finding the no-contribution rule rationally related to the deter-
rent purposes of the antitrust law.24
The question concerning the existence of a right of contribu-
tion was resolved by the Supreme Court in 1981. In an appeal
from Abraham Construction, the Court unanimously held in
Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials2 that Congress, in adopt-
ing the Sherman and Clayton Acts, did not intend to create
contribution rights, and that the federal courts were without
power to fashion common law rules sanctioning contribution in
antitrust litigation. The Court supported its first conclusion by
examining the legislative history of the antitrust laws and con-
cluded that Congress did not provide for contribution either
explicitly or implicitly.26 Reasoning that Congress enacted the
antitrust treble-damage provision as a means to "punish past,
21See, e.g., Olson Farms v. Safeway Stores, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th
Cir. 1979); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979); Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd. sub nom.
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981); In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litig., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,689 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 606 F.2d
319 (5th Cir. 1979).
2604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451
U.S. 630 (1981). In Abraham Construction defendant was accused of fixing prices in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The defendant, Texas Industries, filed a third-
party complaint against other coconspirators. The district court dismissed defendant's
third-party complaint and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal.
"Id. at 901 n.8.
241d. at 904-05.
2451 U.S. 630 (1981).
2Id. at 640.
1983]
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and to deter future, unlawful conduct," 27 the Court found no
evidence that Congress intended to "ameliorate the liability of
wrongdoers. 28
In evaluating the federal common law as a potential source
of the right, the Court confirmed that the formulation of a federal
common law is limited to protecting "uniquely federal interests"
and "those areas in which Congress has given the courts the
power to develop substantive law."'29 Although the Court rec-
ognized that federal interests are at stake under the congres-
sionally enacted antitrust laws, it stated:
Contribution among antitrust wrongdoers does not involve
the duties of the federal Government, the distribution of
powers in our federal system, or matters necessarily subject
to federal control even in the absence of statutory authority
.... In short, contribution does not implicate "uniquely
federal interests" of the kind that obligate courts to formulate
federal common law.30
The Court similarly distinguished between its authority to
develop substantive law principles within the broad mandate of
the statutes and its power to formulate remedies for violations
of the statutes.31 Because Congress explicitly provided for spe-
cific remedies, in contrast to the open-endedness of the sub-
stantive provisions, the Court held that it was without authority
to expand the remedial provisions to include contribution among
defendants. 32 The Court invited Congress to consider the com-
peting policies, values, and interests at stake, but it did not
signal its own views on how those interests should be weighed.33
The Texas Industries decision was extended to claim reduc-
tion by the Fourth Circuit in Burlington Industries v. Milliken
& Co.34 The plaintiff (Burlington) had settled with one defendant
before bringing its suit. The trial judge found for the plaintiff,
but reduced its damage judgment by treble the settlement fig-
27d. at 639.23d.
-9Id. at 640.
3 id. at 642.3
'1d. at 643 (emphasis added).32 d. at 646 (citing Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S 77, 97
(1981)).331d. at 646-47. In light of the Court's statement that "treble damages reveal an intent
to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of
wrongdoers", Congress will be called upon to balance this punishment/deterrence ra-
tionale with the difficult equity issues created by the present status of the law. See
generally Sullivan, supra note 5.
34690 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1982).
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ure.35 The Fourth Circuit overturned the trial judge's damage
determination when it reaffirmed the prevailing rule that any
amount received in settlement should be deducted from plain-
tiffs' damages after trebling, and not before. 6 The court rea-
soned that claim reduction was analogous to contribution and
that, in the absence of a clear legislative indication otherwise,
a district court does not have the inherent discretionary power
to order claim reduction.37 Finally, the court stated that claim
reduction would retard the beneficial effects of partial settle-
ments in antitrust cases.38
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Industries,
interested congressional representatives proposed legislation
that would create a federal right of action for contribution. This
legislation is the subject of the next section.
II. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
This Section briefly describes the various legislative proposals
considered by Congress during the Ninety-seventh and Ninety-
eighth sessions. 39 Although there is considerable variation in the
scope of the proposals, they seem to fall into three categories.
'1Burlington Indus. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 1052, at 413, 414 (D.S.C. 1982).
3Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d at 391.
37Id. at 392-95.
Ad. at 394.
39Of the bills considered by Congress during the Ninety-seventh session, only S. 995,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), had been reintroduced in the Ninety-eighth Congress as of
the time that this Article was written. S. 380, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). This bill will
henceforth be referred to as S. 380. The House Committee on the Judiciary also con-
sidered a number of bills during the Ninety-seventh session, but a substantially different
bill recently has been introduced in committee. H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3
(1983), reprinted in 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1107, at 673 (Mar.
24, 1983).
The authors' opinion is that because the final version of the contribution legislation
probably will incorporate provisions from a number of different bills, a discussion of
the relevant bills introduced in the Ninety-Seventh Congress will be helpful to our
readers and also will provide a comparative perspective.
The two Senate bills provide as follows:
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)) is amended by inserting after section
4H the following new section:
Sec. 41. (a) Two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages
attributable to an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices under section
4, 4A, or 4C of this Act may claim contribution among them according to the
damages attributable to each such person's sales or purchases of goods or
services. A claim for contribution by such person or persons against whom an
action has been commenced may be asserted by cross-claim, counterclaim,
third-party claim, or in a separate action, whether or not an action has been
HeinOnline  -- 20 Harv. J. on Legis. 403 1983
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A. The Price-Fixing Bills
Three legislative provisions share close similarities in sub-
stance and procedure and differ only in their application to
pending antitrust cases. H.R. 407240 and H.R. 124211 were con-
sidered by the House Judiciary Committee last session, and
S. 38042 is presently before the Senate.
The House bills were expressly applicable only to horizontal
price-fixing agreements, while S. 380 is cast in terms of price-
fixing, and thus possibly covers resale price maintenance. All
three bills provide a right of contribution according to the dam-
brought or a judgment has been rendered against the persons from whom
contribution is sought.
(b) A release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment received
in settlement by one of two or more persons subject to contribution under this
section shall not discharge any other persons from liability unless its terms
expressly so provide. The court shall reduce the claim of the person giving the
release or covenant against other persons subject to liability by the greatest
of: (1) any amount stipulated by the release or covenant, (2) the amount of
consideration paid for it, or (3) treble the actual damages attributable to the
settling person's sales or purchases of goods or services. Under item (3) above,
actual damages shall not be trebled in proceedings under section 4A of this
Act.
(c) A release or covenant, or an agreement which provides for a release or
covenant, entered into in good faith, relieves the recipient from liability to any
other person for contribution, with respect to the claim of the person giving
the release or covenant, or agreement, unless the settlement provided for in
any such release, covenant, or agreement is not consummated.
(d) Nothing in this section shall affect the joint and several liability of any
person who enters into an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices.
(e) This section shall apply to all actions under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this
Act commenced after the date of enactment of this section.
(f)(1) The claim reduction principle of subsection (b) of this section shall also
apply to actions alleging an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices under
section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act, which are pending on the date of enactment
of this section, if upon proof by any party subject to liability for damages in
such an action, the court determines that it would be inequitable, in light of
all the circumstances and notwithstanding subsection (f)(2), not to apply the
principle in that action. In ruling on a request to apply claim reduction, the
court shall find the facts specially.
(f)(2) No agreement to settle, compromise, or release a claim under section 4,
4A, or 4C of this Act which has been signed by the parties prior to the date of
enactment of this section may be rescinded, disapproved, reformed, or modified
by the parties or by the court because of the application of the claim reduction
principle, except upon the written consent of all the parties thereto.
(g) Each subsection of this section is severable from all other subsections, and
the invalidity of any subsection for any reason shall not affect the validity of
the remaining subsections: Provided, that subsections (f)(l) and (f)(2) are not
severable from each other, and the invalidity of any provision of those subsec-
tions as applied in an action shall render the remainder of those subsections
inapplicable in that action."
4097th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).4197th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).4298th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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ages attributable to each firm's sales or purchases of goods and
services. The bills also permit the assertion of contribution
claims via a number of procedures. 43
Where the plaintiff settles with one or more defendants, all
three bills would require the reduction of a plaintiff's claim for
damages by the greatest of: (1) the amount stipulated in the
settlement agreement, (2) the actual settlement figure paid by
the settling party or parties, or (3) treble the actual damages
attributable to the settling party's sales or purchases. Obviously,
it seems probable that the third provision will be invoked most
frequently.44
The bills all provide that any defendant who settles in good
faith would not be liable for contribution to any other person
concerning the claim that was settled. In the Senate bill this
provision is intended to encourage settlements by ensuring that
any settling defendants would not be liable in contribution
claims asserted by nonsettling defendants. 45
Finally, the bills differ somewhat with respect to their retro-
active effect. H.R. 1242 would apply only to actions filed after
the bill was enacted, while S. 380 and H.R. 4072 are expressly
applicable to pending cases. The claim reduction features of
H.R. 4072 would be applicable to pending cases except where
they "would result in manifest injustice. ' 46 S. 380 has a more
elaborate retroactivity provision that would permit application
of the claim reduction provision to pending cases if "the court
determines that it would be inequitable, in light of all the cir-
cumstances ... , not to apply the principle in that action." 47 A
closely related provision of S. 380 conditions the validity of the
retroactivity provision on a paragraph of the bill that protects
settlement agreements signed before the effective date of the
act.48
43These proposals, like most of the contribution and claim reduction legislation con-
sidered by the Congress, provide that a party seeking contribution may assert a claim
by counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party action, or a separate lawsuit. Although the
proposals do not articulate the circumstances in which severance or joinder of claims
is appropriate, it has been argued that the federal district courts have ample authority
to dictate the appropriate procedure. See Jacobson, supra note 5, at 235, 239-40.
41S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1982) (supplemental views of Sens.
Kennedy and Metzenbaum).
43d. at 29-30.
46H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(e) (1981).
47S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(f)(1) (1983).
"According to the committee report on S. 995, subsection 4I(g) of S. 380 makes the
dual retroactivity provisions of subsection 41(f) unseverable from one another in the
event either section is struck down. S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 30-31
1983]
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B. Vertical and Horizontal Conspiracy Bills
The Justice Department submitted one bill, H.R. 579449, to
the House, and the House Committee on the Judiciary prepared
two additional bills that modified the Justice Department bill in
significant ways. A fourth bill, H.R. 2244, recently has been
introduced in the House Judiciary Committee. These four bills
would be applicable to both vertical and horizontal antitrust
activity.
1. H.R. 5794. This bill is significantly different from the three
preceding bills, both in substance and procedure. First, this bill
expressly reaches any antitrust activity, not just horizontal
price-fixing. 50 Second, the bill sets forth a definite statute of
limitations of six months following final judgment in the litigation
for which contribution is sought.51 Third, the bill provides a bar
against contribution claims by or against a settling defendant. 52
With respect to claim reduction, H.R. 5794 requires a reduc-
tion of the plaintiff's claim by the greatest of: (1) the stipulated
amount, (2) the actual consideration paid, or (3) the contribution
share of the settling party.53 The bill further provides that con-
tribution and claim reduction must, "to the extent consistent
with the fair and expeditious conduct of litigation," be 'deter-
mined by the court, and not a jury, after trial of the antitrust
case.
54
In establishing contribution and claim reduction shares and
rights, the proposed bill distinguishes horizontal price-fixing
from other antitrust violations. Contribution shares in price-
fixing cases are determined "on the basis of the relative mag-
nitude in the affected market of each such competitor's sales or
purchases. ' 55 Contribution shares in other claims shall be de-
termined by the court according to the "relative responsibility
of each party for the origination or perpetration of the
(1982). This unseverability feature apparently serves the purpose of ensuring that if the
retroactive claim reduction provision of subsection 41(f)(1) is declared unconstitutional,
then subsection 41(f)(2), which protects settlements previously reached in pending cases,
will also be severed. Id. at 30-31; see also G. BELL, ANTITRUST CONTRIBUTION AND
CLAIM REDUCTION: AN OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT 19 (1982).49H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
-°Id. § 41(a).
11Id. § 41(c).
52d. § 41(d).
531d. § 41(e).
-1d. § 41(g).
-"1d. § 41(f)(2).
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violation" 56 for which the plaintiff has been harmed or the de-
fendants unjustly enriched.
2. Discussion Draft No. 1.7 This bill is a modified version of
H.R. 5794,58 and materially differs from H.R. 5794 only with
respect to the liability of a settling defendant to contribution
claims. It provides that a settling defendant may not claim con-
tribution, and it gives a settling plaintiff and defendant a choice.
First, the parties may, as part of the settlement, agree that the
plaintiff waives any claim against other defendants for the set-
tling defendant's contribution share. The settling defendant
would not be subject to any contribution claims by other defen-
dants. Alternatively, the plaintiff could withhold the waiver and
the settling defendant could be subject to contribution claims
by other defendants. However, the bill further provides that the
total damages collectible from nonsettling defendants shall be
reduced by the greater of the stipulated settlement amount or
the consideration paid for release.5 9 In all other respects, the
bill is identical to H.R. 5794.
3. Discussion Draft No. 2.60 This bill is also a modification of
H.R. 5794,61 and differs from H.R. 5794 by its specification of
contribution shares in vertical agreement cases. Significantly,
the proposed language states that in vertical agreement cases
contribution shares shall be allocated by "dividing the total
damages equally between the functional levels and allocating
shares within each level in accordance with the relative magni-
tude in the affected market of each person's sales or purchases
.... "62 This draft also permits the court to allocate liability
among different levels in any just proportion, when necessary
to avoid an unjust result. The bill apportions contribution claims
in horizontal agreement cases on the basis of each defendant's
relative magnitude and defines the term "relative magnitude" as
-1d. § 41(f)(3).
57The text of this proposed bill is set forth in a letter by Congressman Peter Rodino,
Chairman of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, to Att'y Gen. William French Smith,
42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1056, at 601-02 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Discussion Draft No. 1].
581d. at 601.
"'Discussion Draft No. 1, supra note 57, § 41(f).
6OThe text of this proposed bill is set forth in a letter by Congressman Peter Rodino,
Chairman of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, to Att'y Gen. William French Smith,
42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1056, at 603-04 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Discussion Draft No. 2].
61d. at 601.
62Discussion Draft No. 2, supra note 60, § 41(f)(1).
1983]
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relative market shares in the relevant market. 63 In all other
respects, this bill is identical to H.R. 5794.
4. H.R. 2244.61 This bill, which recently was introduced in
the House Judiciary Committee, applies to any antitrust action,
but is significantly different from the other bills in several re-
spects. This bill permits claim reduction or contribution of dam-
ages among defendants only if the district court, after determin-
ing the amount of damages, concludes that failure to reallocate
or reduce damages "would be substantially unjust with respect
to a defendant. '65 However, the bill also provides that claim
reduction or contribution is permissible only where the
plaintiff's conduct in the lawsuit "significantly contributed to
the substantial injustice." 66 Finally, the bill establishes a floor
on the amount of defendant's damages equal to the minimum of
its relative fault or to its sales or purchases, which serves to
limit the reduction or reallocation of damages. 67
III. AN ANALYTIC APPROACH TO CONTRIBUTION
LEGISLATION
A contribution rule, as a matter of antitrust procedure, is
relevant to the process of allocating damages, and, as a matter
of policy, is relevant to the fundamental values underlying pri-
vate antitrust actions. These procedural concerns and policy
norms have been repeatedly considered and articulated by legal
commentators and the United States Supreme Court, and they
include the deterrent effect of private actions, judicial economy
and litigation complexity, compensation for plaintiffs, and fair-
ness to litigants. Because these considerations and values may
be implicated by legislative proposals for contribution and claim
reduction, it is necessary to consider the nature and effect of
the proposed rules on private antitrust litigation.
A. Deterrence
The first factor concerns the deterrent effect of private anti-
trust actions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
631d. § 41(f)(2).
"AH.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1983), reprinted in 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1107, at 673 (Mar. 24, 1983).
IJd. § 4J(a)(1).
6Id. § 4J(a)(2)(A).
671d. § 4J(a)(2)(B).
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private antitrust actions serve as a powerful deterrent to anti-
competitive conduct. In the Court's recent antitrust decision,
American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.,
Justice Blackmun stated that "[a] principal purpose of the anti-
trust private cause of action ... is, of course, to deter anticom-
petitive practices." In that case, the Court extended the scope
of antitrust liability to nonprofit corporations when their vol-
untary agents engage in anticompetitive conduct. The Court
made it clear that its decision to impose liability on such organ-
izations was based largely on "the congressional intent that the
private right of action deter antitrust violations. '69
Supporters of the contribution rule argue that it would ensure
that all violators would be subject to liability, and that this added
certainty would enhance the deterrent effect of the antitrust
laws. 70 The contrary argument is that allowing d defendant to
redistribute liability reduces the consequences of a violation,
and that this reduction in liability lessens deterrence. 71 The res-
olution of this question depends upon the attitude of the poten-
tial violator toward the risks involved. If a corporation prefers
risking a low probability of a large penalty to a high probability
of a small penalty, then a contribution rule should be favored,
and vice versa. The absence of empirical data prevents a more
definitive resolution of this issue.72
-'102 S. Ct. 1935, 1945 (1982).
69 Id. at 1946; see also Burlington Industries v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 392-93
(4th Cir. 1982) (discussing Hydrolevel Corp. decision in claim reduction context).7
°There is a general body of literature which indicates that certainty of detection and
punishment is a greater deterrent than severity of the penalty. See, e.g., Andenaes, The
General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 964 (1966); see also
R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 119 (1963); 0. WILLIAM-
SON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR 48 (1978); Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 9-11 (1974); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099
(1977); Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in Es-
SAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT Ill (1974); Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 5, at 447, 449 (1981); Polinsky & Shavel, The Optimal Tradeoff between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979). See generally
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 168 (1968);
Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3
J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1974); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (1973).71K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 128-29 (1976); Breit &
Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 693, 705-06 (1973).
72Whether a potential antitrust wrongdoer is deterred more by a small prospect of an
increased damage award or by a greater certainty of a lower penalty is unclear. The
recent economic analysis which has been done using the "expected utility" model of
predicting behavior is equivocal. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, supra note
5, at 344-53, 364-65. The question remains whether the certainty of detection and
1983] 409
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B. Complexity
The second factor concerns 'complexity. The enactment of a
contribution rule would add complications to court proceedings
that already are intricate and expensive. The existing complexity
in private antitrust actions may be attributable to the number of
parties in the lawsuit, their difficulties in explaining and sup-
porting their claims, and the courts' difficulties in deciding on
appropriate relief. The pressures on the courts resulting from
these and other issues have caused the Supreme Court to ex-
press concern over the "feasibility and consequences" of various
damage theories73 and to redefine traditional standards of stat-
utory standing, remoteness, and causation in private antitrust
action. 74 These cases, which strongly reflect growing judicial
concern over litigation complexity, speculative proof of dam-
ages, and the unfairness of duplicative recoveries, counsel cau-
tion in adding new rights of action and novel approaches to the
computation of damages to a litigation system already known
for its complexity and delay.
The effects on the judicial system of the creation of contri-
bution rights can perhaps best be understood within the analyt-
ical framework of transaction costs. 75 If contribution legislation
punishment is a greater deterrent than severity of the penalty. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE
SUBCOMM. ON MONOPOLIES AND COMMERCIAL LAW, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO ALLOCATE DAMAGES
AMONG DEFENDANTS IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, reprinted in 44 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1101, at 280, 288 (Feb. 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
STAFF REPORT]. Notwithstanding the equivocal nature of the theoretical work and the
lack of empirical work, certain tentative observations can be drawn concerning the
effect of contribution and claim reduction legislation on deterrence objectives.
nBlue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2546 n.11 (1982).
741d.; Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). See generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical
Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977); Page, Antitrust Damages
and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467
(1980).7SIhe term "transaction cost" is capable of many meanings. See Polinsky, Economic
Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic
Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1667-68, 1671-74 (1974). This is especially
true in the contribution and claim reduction context. As a general matter, transaction
costs are incurred whenever a group of people get together to bargain or settle. Types
of transaction costs include process costs that are associated with the incremental
expenses of administering a rule, such as additional judge or jury time; coordination
costs associated with additional efforts at generating consensus among many parties to
a transaction; insurance costs associated, for example, with the need to prevent cheating
on a negotiated agreement; and error costs associated with the greater prospect of
incorrect outcomes as complexity of coordination and the number of parties increase.
See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 45-47, 423, 458 (2d ed. 1977); Calabresi,
Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, II J.L. &
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is enacted, a new set of "rights" will be created, and the working
out of these "rights" at different levels of the system will entail
additional costs. To the extent that many of the issues associated
with contribution and claim reduction are already raised in an-
titrust litigation,7 6 however, the consequences to the judicial
system are reduced. Nevertheless, the addition of this right of
action could have significant repercussions on both in-court and
out-of-court costs.
A contribution rule will increase the complexity of antitrust
lawsuits by bringing additional parties into the litigation. Under
the traditional rule, the plaintiff could sue one coconspirator,
litigate his case, and either win or lose. After a contribution rule
is enacted, however, a defendant will be able to implead other
coconspirators as third-party defendants. 77 Merely having ad-
ditional parties in the litigation will increase costs to some de-
gree. Costs and complexity will increase further to the extent
that impleaded parties raise defenses or claims not raised by the
original defendant. However, joinder may not significantly in-
crease discovery costs because the antitrust discovery net gen-
erally is broadly cast to encompass nondefendants that have
knowledge leading to relevant information regarding the alleged
violation.78
Additional complexities may arise in the course of allocating
damages among defendants. If some or all of the impleaded
third-party defendants were to be found liable, a hearing would
be required to determine each defendant's contribution share.
If a method other than the easily applied pro rata formula were
to be chosen for the allocation of damages, this proceeding
would become quite complex. Moreover, if contribution were
sought through the filing of an independent action, rather than
through joinder of parties in the main action, duplication of
effort would result.
A final consideration with regard to complexity is the effect
of a proposed contribution rule on settlements. The existence
EcoN. 67 (1968); Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 142-50
(1979); Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rule, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 797, 827-43 (1973).
76For example, if the plaintiff has decided to use market share analysis to prove his
damages, the addition of a contribution rule that uses market share analysis to determine
contribution shares would not significantly increase litigation costs. See infra note 106.
7Of course, if the plaintiff named all antitrust violators in the original complaint, a
contribution rule would result in no additional costs. See Note, Contribution in Private
Antitrust Actions, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1540, 1549 (1980).
7$Jacobson, supra note 5, at 235.
1983]
HeinOnline  -- 20 Harv. J. on Legis. 411 1983
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 20:397
of additional defendants means that more settlements will have
to be reached, and the relationship between the defendants may
create uncertainties in the minds of both plaintiff and defendant
that will make settlements harder to reach. 9 A contribution rule
also will affect the parties' incentives to settle. It is frequently
stated that private antitrust actions and the prospect of treble
damage recoveries provide a substantial incentive to settle liti-
gation. 0 If a defendant is permitted to shift a portion of liability
to another, then there is less incentive to settle before liability
is established, and to the degree one is permitted to decrease
damages owed, the incentive to settle is decreased correspond-
ingly.8' Any decrease in the settlement rate could have a severe
impact on the efficiency of the courts, given the large number
of antitrust filings and the scarcity of judicial resources. 82
It should be noted that despite the fact that a contribution
rule may increase the complexity of the litigation, federal trial
courts have had substantial experience with contribution rules.
Since 1933, the courts have successfully applied contribution
79See supra note 75.
8See, e.g., Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 365.8
'Id. at 365-67; Note, A Case Against Contribution in Antitrust, 58 TEx. L. REV.
961, 980-82 (1980).
Because a plaintiff can choose to settle with each defendant sequentially or with them
all together, the analysis of settlement incentives becomes complicated. An important
issue is whether a contribution rule will result in a higher rate of terminated litigation
than a no-contribution rule, and this requires a consideration of incentives and disin-
_centives in partial, global, and sequential settlements strategies.
Some tentative observations are possible. A policy favoring partial settlements might
result in more settlements than a policy favoring global settlements. The first reason is
that coordination costs are quite high in a global settlement. Second, there is a greater
inducement to settle when one alleged coconspirator has settled and the remaining
defendants may have to ante up an amount greater than their aliquot portion of the
gains from illegal conduct. Moreover, it would seem that the effect of the sequential
settlement strategy has been quite positive. See Withrow and Larm, The "Big" Antitrust
Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1976). Former Attorney
General Griffin Bell has contended that contribution and claim reduction favor "global"
settlements because they remove the plaintiff's incentive to enter into partial settlements
by eliminating market share "uncertainty" in plaintiff's negotiation and settlement. See
G. BELL, supra note 48, at 14-15; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 457-
62. However, at this point there is no clear indication of the effect of contribution and
claim reduction legislation on attaining global settlements, and there is no demonstrable
indication that a rule favoring global settlements would be more effective in increasing
pretrial settlements than the current sequential settlement strategy.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected Bell's arguments, concluding that an-
titrust law and policy favored partial settlements. Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co.,
690 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1982).
"'See Conrac Corp. v. AT&T, 546 F. Supp. 429, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also With-
row & Larm, supra note 81, at 6, where the authors detail the tremendous number of
private antitrust cases filed, pending, and resolved in the federal courts. Of particular
importance is the authors' statement that approximately 40% of filed private actions are
settled before litigation.
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rules under the federal securities laws. Securities litigation is
not significantly more complex than antitrust litigation.83 Both
types of cases generally raise complicated economic, factual,
and theoretical issues in a multiparty setting. In addition, courts,
while exercising diversity jurisdiction, are experienced in apply-
ing contribution rules under state law, and various procedural
rules84 have assisted trial courts in the management of complex
cases.
C. Compensation for Plaintiffs
A primary concern of antitrust plaintiffs is undoubtedly the
recovery of damages. The Supreme Court has consistently
found that a congressional purpose to compensate victims is
manifest within the antitrust laws .85 Though this objective re-
cently has come under attack,8 6 it is clear that any congressional
action that threatens plaintiffs' ability to recover their damages
will be intensely scrutinized by the Court.
D. Fairness to the Litigants
The final factor to be considered is perhaps the most difficult
one: fairness to the parties. Fairness issues are encountered in
the analysis of a contribution and claim reduction statute when
there is either a transfer of part of the plaintiffs' control over
the litigation to the defendants, or a shift of monetary liability
among defendants, or a change in relative strengths in the ne-
gotiation of settlements. 87 For example, and as discussed more
fully below, permitting defendants to allocate monetary liability
&3See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 398-401.
8FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) specifically permits the courts to provide for separate trials
on "any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim or third-party claims or issues" to further
convenience or avoid prejudice. FED. R. Civ. P. 21 establishes trial court discretion to
drop parties or to sever claims and proceed separately. In addition, the rules permit the
submission of special verdict forms or interrogatories to the jury in complex cases. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
"See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct.
1935 (1982); Pfizer. Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978).
8See, e.g., Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68
GEO. L.J. 1075, 1091-96 (1980) (Compensation in antitrust cases should be viewed as
an incentive to vindicate anticompetitive conduct rather than as compensation for
injuries suffered.).
"See Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 339-44; STAFF REPORT, supra
note 72, at 283-87. ,
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on the basis of relative fault may be fair to the defendants inter
sese; but reducing a victim's damage entitlement by some mul-
tiple of settlement may not be just as between the victim and
the defendants.
Supreme Court decisions, although not entirely consistent,
have articulated a need to consider issues of fairness presented
by legislative enactments. For example, in United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co.,88 the Court held that the mere fact that
contribution may complicate litigation, because of difficulty in
determining degrees of fault, does not justify the unjust results
caused by an equal division of damages. The Court observed
that "congestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that
producds unjust results in litigation simply to encourage speedy
out-of-court accommodation." 89 Clearly, then, contribution leg-
islation will require a balancing of economic realities and judicial
constraints against "unjust results" in particular cases.
The adoption of contribution legislation would resolve the
perceived unfairness resulting from the "joint and several lia-
bility" rule of antitrust common law. A single defendant, under
such legislation, no longer would be held liable for the plain-
tiff's entire damage claim while coconspirators went free.9° A
number of other fairness questions would remain to be consid-
ered in the legislation, however. First, in designing a rule that
affects both antitrust plaintiffs and defendants, Congress should
be concerned with unduly restrictive procedures that limit the
parties' ability to advance the action. Second, in large part
antitrust liability follows intentional and avoidable conduct, and
notions of fairness are stronger for innocent victims than for
intentional wrongdoers. 9 Third, antitrust violations and anti-
trust litigation impose costs on society and Congress should
consider carefully the fairness of any rule that increases those
costs, even though the rule seems fair to the litigants. 92 Fourth,
notions of fairness in the allocation of liability among defendants
are stronger where a reallocation is necessary to achieve some
broader public objective, such as preservation of small busi-
-421 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1975). But cf. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S.
630 (1981).
"9Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 408.
9°See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 1077 (the possibility of an error is a "process cost").
See generally R. POSNER, supra note 57, at § 21.2.
9'Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 339-44.
92See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1978).
HeinOnline  -- 20 Harv. J. on Legis. 414 1983
Antitrust Contribution Litigation
nesses. 93 Such public objectives, however, should be clearly
articulated and closely related to the statutory alteration.
Ultimately, serious consideration of contribution legislation
requires a sensitive balancing of procedural difficulties and pol-
icy norms. This effort, in an imperfect world, should attempt to
achieve equitable ends without disproportionately increasing
transaction costs, and should involve a search for the best pro-
cedural mechanism to implement antitrust values in an efficient
and fair manner.
IV. CONTRIBUTION LEGISLATION: AN ANALYSIS
The legislative proposals surveyed in Section II will have
various effects on antitrust policy. As the Supreme Court's
decisions implicitly recognize, there is no commonly recognized
hierarchy of values-only an array of factors, differing in
weights and importance, from which decisions may be made. 94
It is therefore difficult to assign specific values or weights to
factors that are implicated by a legislative proposal for contri-
bution rights. However, there may be value to the decision-
maker in the identification of the complexities and incongruities
created by a statute, as well as an assessment of a statute's
probable likelihood of achieving its intended results. This Sec-
tion analyzes the contribution proposals in light of certain char-
acteristics that bring into question the ability of the statutes to
fairly and efficiently advance the goals of antitrust law.
A. Coverage of the Right to Contribution
Several proposed bills extend the right to obtain contribution
only to defendants in horizontal price-fixing cases.95 This narrow
coverage seems counterintuitive, for price-fixers receive little
sympathy from the courts. 96 For example, in Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Society,97 a case involving allegations of
93See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1979).
94Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982); see American Soc'y of Mechanical
Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
95See, e.g., S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(a) (1983); H.R. 1242, 97th Cong, Ist
Sess. § 41(a) (1981).
9Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643 (1980); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940).
9'102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
1983] 415
HeinOnline  -- 20 Harv. J. on Legis. 415 1983
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 20:397
horizontal price-fixing among physicians, the Court reiterated
its longstanding position that horizontal price-fixing lacks any
redeeming value and should receive the most stringent antitrust
scrutiny. Price-fixing defendants therefore may be unworthy of
any special consideration with regard to the distribution of dam-
ages, and to the extent that a contribution rule reduces deter-
rence, it is most unjustifiable here. 98
The limitation of a right to contribution to price-fixers ex-
cludes several classes of defendants that deserve more favorable
treatment. For example, in dealer termination cases, 99 where a
vertically related party (e.g., manufacturer or supplier) may be
the most culpable actor, the defendant may not be permitted to
assert contribution rights against the unnamed manufacturer or
supplier.100 Moreover, vertical and horizontal arrangements
should be distinguished, as they are in large part in standards
of antitrust liability,10 because beneficial effects often accom-
pany vertical nonprice restrictions, and the harshness of the no-
contribution rule may unnecessarily inhibit otherwise procom-
petitive conduct.102
98Note, supra note 81, at 971-77 (1980).
Former Attorney General Griffin Bell, a principal proponent of legislation like S. 380,
has failed to address the rather perverse set of priorities seemingly established by the
legislation. See G. BELL, supra note 48, at 11-12. He first makes the theoretical argument
that a contribution and claim reduction regime may reduce price-fixing because the
current no-contribution scheme may encourage price-fixing by letting some coconspir-
ators enter into cheap settlement agreements, with the implicit encouragement of price-
fixing activity. Id. at 11. Bell then dismisses "economic theorists" who conclude to the
contrary, as not providing "any useful guidance on the question of deterrence." Id. at
12. Bell then suggests that deterrence may not be an appropriate objective of private
actions because a great deal of price-fixing is perpetrated by "low-level employees"
who, by a single conversation about prices with a competitor, can make an employer
liable for the total damages caused by a large conspiracy. Id.
Bell's analysis is reminiscent of the "tail-wagging-the-dog" metaphor because the
purpose of a deterrence function to an enactment is to compel an employer to take a
more active and meaningful supervisory role over employees to prevent violation of
public laws. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct.
1935 (1982). Moreover, it suggests that some proponents of contribution and claim
reduction legislation are more interested in changing standards of liability, particularly
the per se rule, than in serious consideration of the antitrust implications of the
legislation.
99"'his term refers to a a situation where a manufacturer has refused to sell to a dealer
because the dealer did not act in accordance with the manufacturer's wishes with respect
to the product.
10OThe factual situation in Professional Beauty Supply v. National Beauty Supply, 594
F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979), presents a classic illustration of an unfair or unjust result
where contribution or claim reduction is not permitted in a vertical restriction case. See
S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1982) (supplemental views of Sens. Metz-
enbaum and Kennedy); Sullivan, supra note 5, at 418-19.
'
0 Sullivan, supra note 5, at 418-19.
102Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 367-68; Sullivan, supra note 5, at
418-19.
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Finally, providing contribution rights to price-fixing cartel
members may provide a strong incentive for refining the cartel
agreement for prospective apportionment of damages in the
event of detection. 0 3 This form of transaction cost associated
with maintenance of a cartel agreement is an additional cost
borne by consumers and other cartel victims.
B. Computation of Contribution Shares
One critical aspect of several contribution and claim reduction
bills is the reliance on market share analysis to compute contri-
bution shares and reduced claims. For example, H.R. 5794 re-
quires contribution shares to be computed "on the basis of the
relative magnitude in the affected market of each competitor's
sales or purchases of goods or services,"' while H.R. 1242
requires computation "according to the damages attributable to
each [price-fixer's] sales or purchases of goods or services."'0 5
The use of market share analysis as an integral part of a right
to contribution or a defense of claim reduction is inappropriate
for at least two reasons. First, a plaintiff may choose not to
prove damages by market share analysis, but rather may select
The teaching of the Supreme Court's decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), is that strong policy considerations exist for treating vertical nonprice
restrictions different than horizontal restrictions. These considerations, according to the
Court, include economic justifications for vertical restrictions and a greater likelihood
that such restrictions will achieve procompetitive results. See Pitofsky, The Sylvania
Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977).
Former Attorney General Griffin Bell contends, however, that a strong case can be
made for extending contribution rights to price-fixers. He argues that a plaintiff may
choose to settle with some defendants at a discount because he knows that he can
recover the remainder of his damages from the nonsettling defendants. This results in
a transfer of capital from nonsettling defendants to settling defendants and will force
the nonsettling defendants to charge higher prices, which results in a reduction of
consumer welfare. G. BELL, supra note 48, at 7-9.
This analysis, however, assumes that the cartel has made no supracompetitive profits
with which to pay the judgment, and that supracompetitive profits obtained by price-
fixing is a socially acceptable source of capital. If the firms which do not settle have
not stored away their share of the cartel's supracompetitive profits, however, the excess
liability which they have to bear may drive them out of the industry. Finally, as an
empirical matter, the Staff of the House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial
Law found no cases "in which a small, relatively less culpable defendant has paid an
outlandish judgment resulting in bankruptcy." STAFF REPORT, supra note 72, at 284.
t03See generally Hay & Kelly, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17
J.L. & ECON. 13 (1974).
1-H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(f)(2) (1982).
105H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1981).
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some other method of computing damages in an antitrust case.t16
If a plaintiff chooses to prove damages by a "before and after"
method, for example, but settles with one defendant before trial,
the plaintiff may find his total claim reduced by "treble the actual
damages attributable to the settling person's sales or purchases
of goods or services."10 7 It seems perverse to grant plaintiffs a
choice of damage remedies and then remove that choice by
reducing claims according to market share.108
Second, the use of market share as the method of determining
contribution shares injects a great deal of complexity into anti-
trust actions.'09 The relevant product market must first be de-
fined, which requires a showing as to the existence and effec-
tiveness of substitutes. A delineation of the appropriate
geographic market may then be necessary." 0 Evidence then
'
0 6Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, Comprehensive Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Anti-
trust Plaintiffs, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1233 (1976).
There are essentially four methods of computing damages in a private antitrust case:
"before and after" profits, see, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251
(1976); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); a
"yardstick" theory, see, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); foregone profits or loss
of going concern value, see, e.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. v. Forster Mfg., 421 F.2d
61 (st Cir. 1970); and a market share theory, see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, 395 U.S. 100 (1969). See generally Parker, Measure of Damages in Federal
Treble Damage Actions, 17 ANTiTRUsT BULL. 497 (1972); Note, Measure of Damages
for Destruction of All or Part of A Business, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1566 (1967).
'07H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1981).
'°8The imposition of market share analysis in a case where the plaintiff contemplates
proof of damages by some other method presents the equitable problem of the
plaintiff's potential loss of control over negotiation and settlement strategy and over
the methods of discovery and proof of damages. There also may be concerns by antitrust
plaintiffs that market share contribution and claim reduction computations may permit
more numerous and well-financed defendants to overwhelm the plaintiff in the pretrial
and trial process.
There are also transaction cost issues. A mandatory computation method may increase
the possibility of error by plaintiffs in negotiating settlements, and it may increase
discovery costs by the requiring additional efforts to determine relative market shares.
Finally, process costs may be increased because a district court may have to sever the
main antitrust case, in which damages and injury are demonstrated by one method,
from the contribution case, in which damages must be reexamined using a market share
methodology for allocation of damages.
To some extent, the establishment of a separate hearing on the computation of market
shares, to the extent they are not determined in the main antitrust action, may ameloriate
some of the transaction costs facing antitrust plaintiffs. For example, H.R. 5794 requires
such a post-trial hearing by the courts. Such a hearing, however, would not clearly
address the problems of ascertaining settlement options and could very likely increase
process costs by the court in conducting two trials with two sets of evidence and
methods of proving damages.
"'9See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 908-22 (1980); Landes &
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939-52 (1981).
110 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 230-231 (3d ed. 1981).
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must be gathered which pinpoints each defendant's involvement
in each market.
The legislative proposals do little to resolve these questions.
Only one proposal, Discussion Draft No. 2, defines "goods" and
"purchases," and it appears that even those definitions cannot
remove the fairly substantial problems left for judicial resolu-
tion."' It also seems probable that victims of antitrust conspir-
acies will be forced to address the definitional issues in the main
antitrust action and that the courts will be faced with resolution
of definitional disputes in adjudicating contribution shares.
There are some difficulties associated with use of the relative
responsibility or comparative fault concept employed by
H.R. 5794 and Discussion Draft No. 1. Those provisions ad-
vocate a relative responsibility method in all except horizontal
price-fixing cases. The principal difficulty involves discerning
each firm's complicity in a multimarket, vertical, national anti-
trust violation. Although a very strong case can be made for a
comparative fault method of computing contribution shares,112
it also appears that the method could increase complexity in the
main antitrust case by requiring the parties, conceivably includ-
ing the plaintiff, to litigate difficult issues of fault in a contri-
bution hearing. It seems equally clear, however, that use of a
relative fault method may be the fairest of all methods with
respect to an allocation of responsiblity among defendants, may
achieve the greatest deterrence effect of all contribution pro-
posals, and may be the most familiar methodology because it is
premised on traditional concepts of proof."1
One proposal, Discussion Draft No. 2, uses a pro rata con-
tribution method in vertical agreement cases, but goes on to
accord the district court latitude to allocate contribution shares
in some other fashion where a pro rata method proves "mani-
"'See S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-49 (1982).
"
2See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 416-23. The author details the equitable and policy
considerations in a rule of comparative fault. Such a standard may require consideration
of the actor's intent and should not be applied to traditionally per se antitrust violations.
This selective application of a comparative fault contribution rule would maximize the
deterrence effect of a contribution proposal and, if coupled with a reasonable claim
reduction provision, would prove eminently fair to all parties.
"'Id. Comparative fault or relative responsibility as a measure of contribution rights
may achieve the greatest deterrence effect of the various proposals because of the closer
relationship between the illegal conduct and the amount of the penalty. Id. at 421.
Secondly, federal judges are currently accustomed to making determinations of lia-
bility on the basis of fault. In this respect it appears that use of relative fault as a
computation method may not increase process costs as much as other methods.
19831 419
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festly unjust." Some commentators on contribution legislation
advocate pro rata contribution for the reason that such a rule is
least expensive for the courts and the parties to administer and
minimizes transaction costs." 4 A pro rata rule also may enhance
the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. If we assume that firms
are risk averse," 5 the possibility that each will be forced to pay
damages in excess of its responsibility will reduce the likelihood
that it will violate the law. 16 On the other hand, the use of a
pro rata method raises the issue of fairness among defendants,
as each defendant must share liability equally, irrespective of
culpability." 7
H.R. 2244 advocates the use of relative magnitude and com-
parative fault methodologies to determine the floor on the
amount of reduction or reallocation of damages. However, be-
fore these methods will be used, a culpable defendant must
demonstrate that there is substantial injustice because he is
paying a disproportionate amount of the awarded damages and
that the plaintiff was somehow responsible for the injustice. 8
C. Claim Reduction
Closely associated with the problems of computing contribu-
tion shares are problems of mandatory claim reduction. First,
anything that reduces the absolute amount of liability facing
each defendant may reduce the disincentive to engage in the
proscribed conduct.' 9 Therefore, the deterrence objective of
the antitrust laws will be affected by any claim reduction legis-
lation. Second, as the complexity of computing contribution
shares increases, there may be a proportional increase in the
complexity of negotiating and settling antitrust cases. 20
"'1Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 365-66.
Transaction costs, under a pro rata computation method, are lower because individual
market shares need not be ascertained, the judgment instead being shared in equal parts
by the defendants. Nor would the fact finder need to make allocations of responsibility,
as would be the case with a relative responsibility method. The court, after a finding of
joint liability, would merely apportion the individual liability in equal shares.
'
5 See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., 604 F.2d 897, 901 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1979), aff'd. sub nom. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
116Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 365-66; Jacobson, supra note 5,
at 242-45.
117 See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
118H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4J(a) (1983), reprinted in 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1107, at 673 (Mar. 24, 1983).
119See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
1'2 See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
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Virtually all the contribution proposals provide that a settling
defendant cannot be sued for contribution, but instead require
a reduction in the plaintiff's claim against the remaining, non-
settling defendants. The provision forbidding contribution
claims against settling defendants should facilitate the negotia-
tion and settlement of antitrust claims by providing some finality
to the prospective liability of a settling defendant, and therefore
seems beneficial to antitrust legislation. 121
Some difficulties are presented by the waiver or release pro-
vision contained in Discussion Draft No. 1.122 That provision
provides that the plaintiff may elect to release the settling de-
fendant from future contribution claims by the amount of the
settling defendant's contribution share. In that case, the amount
of the settlement must equal or exceed the settling defendant's
contribution share. Conversely, the plaintiff can withhold the
waiver, which would permit nonsettling defendants to assert
claims against the settling defendant for his contribution share.
This provision obviously accords the plaintiff and settling de-
fendant some latitude in negotiating settlements and accords
some fairness among the defendants, but it also seems to inject
potential impediments into the negotiation and settlement pro-
cess. It appears that much of the impetus for contribution leg-
islation stems from a few examples of plaintiffs extorting se-
riatim settlements from defendants.123 Although these situations
seem infrequent, it is apparent that the burden of accurately
assessing a settlement strategy, and trading off the settlement
price against the prospect of significant liability, is currently on
antitrust defendants. The waiver principle in Discussion Draft
No. 1 may shift the coercive impact onto the plaintiffs and may,
as a practical matter, require a plaintiff to receive less in settle-
"'A statutory release in an antitrust case bars subsequent recovery against a settling
defendant, and it seems to accord with the common law rule. See Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 342-49 (1971). Obviously, such a rule is necessary
in the context of contribution and claim reduction legislation where promotion of set-
tlements and finality of litigation are important objectives. See generally Easterbrook,
Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 333-34.
"'Discussion Draft No. 1, supra note 57, § 41(e).
"'See S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982). In fact, the entire legislative
history of the contribution and claim reduction legislation, beginning with S. 1468, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), through the current proposals, suggests intense pressure from
defendants in a few significant antitrust cases. See S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 50 (1982) (supplemental views of Sens. Metzenbaum and Kennedy); see also
Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (reflecting significant interest from parties in cases partially
affected by contribution and claim reduction legislation); G. BELL, supra note 48, at 2.
1983]
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ment because a settling defendant wants to limit his exposure
to a set sum, the settlement amount. It therefore seems that the
waiver or release provision does not really add anything in
resolving complexity and settlement problems; defendants will
demand a full release and the plaintiff's recoverable damages
will be reduced by the settling defendant's contribution share.
On the other hand, it may also be true that the waiver or
release provision gives the plaintiff and settling defendant some
flexibility in settlement decisions. Depending upon the strength
of the plaintiff's case, the defendant's desire to avoid litigation,
and the plaintiff's need for funds to advance the litigation, the
choices may be freely exercised. Similarly, the waiver provision
may allow the plaintiff to move the settlement price closer to
the settling defendant's contribution share. 2 4
The "substantial injustice" standard advocated in H.R. 2244,
which reposes great discretion in the district court to reduce the
plaintiff's damage award or to require contribution among de-
fendants (the bill speaks in terms of "reallocation," but because
"reallocation" and "contribution" are synonomous in this con-
text, the latter will be used to maintain consistency) presents
several problems. First, the House Subcommittee Report pro-
vides little guidance on how the substantial injustice standard is
to be applied.' 25 Furthermore, application of the standard may
involve a separate procedural phase and thus may increase pro-
cess costs in antitrust cases. 2 6 Insofar as the bill permits a
1"4Cf. G. BELL, supra note 48, at 13 (suggesting that the presence or absence of
contribution and claim reduction rights may have less to do with the decision to settle
than various other subjective factors).
' The House Subcommittee report accompanying the introduction of H.R. 2244 in-
terprets the term "substantial injustice" to mean several "policy considerations"
including:
the amount of the judgment in relation to the role of the defendant, the strength
of the evidence against the defendant, the seriousness of the violation, the
degree of intent involved, the cooperation of the defendant in furnishing evi-
dence and expediting the proceedings, [and] the amount of damages necessary
to compensate the plaintiff.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 72, at 297.
1-6The Subcommittee Staff Report suggests that the court can make a finding of
substantial injustice on the record after the determination of damages, and that no
additional procedures will be necessary. Id. The report goes on to recognize that the
defendant, in establishing a case of harm from disproportionate liability, could allege
several factual matters, such as "relative size, lack of intent, weak evidence, [and]
unclear legal standards." Id. at 298. The defendant, however, has the burden to make
the necessary showing of disproportionality and injustice. Id. Such an difficult factual
showing by defendants would necessitate a separate phase or proceeding to a concluded
antitrust case, because parties may be reluctant to place these matters before the jury
in the main action.
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reduction in plaintiff's recovery below actual damages where
plaintiff's conduct in the action significantly contributes to the
substantial injustice, it injects greater uncertainty into the liti-
gation. This provision seemingly serves the laudable goal of
ameliorating situations of disproportionate liability when the
plaintiff enters into "sweetheart" settlements with powerful,
more culpable defendants and thereafter seeks to recover the
full judgement from weaker defendants. 127 However, even the
House Subcommittee Staff recognizes that instances of dispro-
portionate damage awards are "rare," and this conclusion raises
concerns about the applicability of the bill's contribution and
claim reduction provisions in other antitrust cases.128 Finally,
H.R. 2244 provides that contribution or claim reduction may
not decrease an individual defendant's liability below its relative
culpability or market share, which grants power to the district
court to alter the rule of joint and several liability in individual
cases. 29 While the exercise of this provision may well affect the
victim compensation objectives of the antitrust law, it may
nevertheless advance its deterrence and fairness objectives. In
the absence of a clearer demonstration of the bill's ramifications
for antitrust litigation, and a better articulation of legislative
objectives, it is difficult to assess the impact of H.R. 2244 on
antitrust law and policy.
D. The Right to a Jury Trial in Determining Contribution
Shares
Of the contribution proposals discussed in Section II, only
H.R. 5794 and H.R. 2244 have special provisions regarding the
use of jury trials in the apportionment of contribution shares.
An earlier version of H.R. 5794 left the determination of the
127See id. Indeed, according to the Subcommittee Staff Report, the entire impetus of
the bill is to protect defendants against inequitable and unfair results occasioned by
settlement threats by allowing them to vindicate their innocence without coercion or
fear of inordinate liability. Id. at 287-88.
128 d. at 288.
129The Subcommittee Staff Report recognized the conflicting aspects of the rule of
joint and several liability. Initially, this rule threatens small defendants with damages
judgments many times greater than their shares of the liability, while larger defendants
face potential damage judgments only a few times greater than their actual liability. Id.
at 288. However, any scheme that reduces damage judgments and increases litigation
costs decreases the plaintiff's ability to obtain compensation. Id. at 298.
1983]
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contribution issue to the judge alone. 30 Because of "possible
Seventh Amendment problems,"' 3' the following language was
added to H.R. 5794: "[u]nless inconsistent with the just and
expeditious conduct of litigation, contribution and claim reduc-
tion rights shall be determined by the court sitting without a
jury."'1 32 H.R. 2244 adopts the same limitation on jury rights as
H.R. 5794.133
Consistent with the Seventh Amendment's command that the
right to a jury trial be "preserved,"' 34 the courts decide whether
or not to grant a jury trial on the basis of the common law
practice as of 1791.135 Intervening changes in our legal system
have forced the courts to respond flexibly to new situations.
Specifically, the merger of law and equity have forced the Court
to reexamine the bases underlying the jury trial right. Under
prior practice, for example, the "clean-up" doctrine allowed a
chancellor to resolve legal issues in the process of resolving an
equitable claim. In a pair of famous decisions, the Court disal-
lowed this practice and held that legal issues should be deter-
mined by the jury, and that equitable issues should be resolved
by the judge. 136
The standard for determining whether a legal issue is pre-
sented was decided by the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bern-
hard.137 The Court opined that "the 'legal' nature of an issue is
determined by considering, first, the pre-merger [of law and
13°Statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, House of
Rep., 97th Cong., Mar. 3, 1982, at 23.
'
311d. at 23-24. Mr. Baxter further stated, "[Since] the submission of our original
draft, we have made additional efforts to satisfy ourselves on the constitutionality of
eliminating jury trials for contribution issues. Unfortunately, we have not been able to
reach a firm conclusion."
132H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(g) (1982) (emphasis added).
133H.R. 2244,98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4J(b) (1983), reprinted in 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1107, at 673 (Mar. 24, 1983).
"3U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
1
35Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
"3Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500 (1959). In Beacon Theatres, the Court rejected the so-called "clean-up" doctrine
which permitted the court to hear legal claims without a jury when necessary in adju-
dicating equitable claims. 359 U.S. at 510-11. In Dairy Queen, the Court went further
in establishing a nondiscretionary interpretation of the Seventh Amendment by holding
that the issues need not be predominantly legal in nature before the jury right could be
invoked. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 473. If the claim was legal, regardless of its sub-
stantiality in relation to equitable claims, the right to ajury trial was recognized.
137396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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equity] custom; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the prac-
tical abilities and limitation of juries.' 138
American courts seeking common law analogies for antitrust
actions have looked to the law of torts. 139 The inquiry, therefore,
is directed to the availability of a jury trial to determine contri-
bution rights in a tort case in England in 1791.
Some American courts have disposed of the jury trial issue
simply by stating that contribution is an equitable doctrine and
therefore is not covered by the Seventh Amendment. 140 This
analysis is, at best, too cursory. Admittedly there is little doubt
that the doctrine of contribution had its origins in equity.'4' But
in spite of its equitable origins, the doctrine of contribution also
came to be recognized in the English law courts by the end of
the eighteenth century. 142 A form of contribution among negli-
gent joint tortfeasors was recognized as early as 1622 in the case
of Arundel v. Gardiner.143 Since tort cases in general, and con-
tribution cases in particular, were decided by law courts, the
historical analysis suggests that a jury trial would be available
in contribution and claim reduction litigation.
1"Id. at 538 n.10.
39See, e.g., Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.
Cal.), mandamus denied, 393 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 842 (1968). But
see Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust'Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682, 693, 696-
97 (1978) (antitrust actions sound in quasi-contract rather than in tort). Technically,
there was no premerger custom in the context of contribution and claim reduction rights
in an antitrust case. Indeed, the adoption of H.R. 5794 would create such rights. The
Supreme Court has rejected this purely historical method of analysis, however, and has
made it clear that statutorily created rights are to be afforded Seventh Amendment
protections, provided that the issues involved bear a close analogy to issues tried to
English juries in 1791. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
'"'See, e.g., Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see
also Jones v. Schramm, 436 F.2d 899, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
The doctrine of contribution originated in the courts of equity .... [W]hen
contribution is sought against a defendant who was not sued by plaintiff, as is
permitted by our decisions, the claim sounds in equity and the court acts as
finder of the fact to determine whether the second tortfeasor from whom
contribution is sought was negligent, and therefore liable to the victim.
'See Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Ves. Jun. 160, 33 Eng. Rep. 482 (1807); see also
3. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1418 (1883).
42See Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 736-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Fayh, J., dissenting); see also Cowell v. Edwards, 2 Bos. & Pul. 268, 126 Eng. Rep.
1275 (1800).
"41Cro. Jac. 652, 79 Eng. Rep. 563 (1622). Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 T.R. 186, 101
Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799), is often cited for the proposition that there was no contribution
among joint tortfeasors under the common law. However, Merryweather was an inten-
tional tort case, and the later case of Betts v. Gibbins distinguished Merryweather:
"Merryweather seems to me to have been strained beyond what the decision will bear.
The present case is an exception to the general rule. The general rule is, that between
wrongdoers there is neither indemnity nor contribution: the exception is, where the act
is not clearly illegal in itself .... " 2 Ad. & E. 57, 74-77, Ill Eng. Rep. 22, 29-30
(1834).
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The premerger custom is, however, only the beginning of the
judicial analysis. Inquiry must also be directed to the nature of
the remedy sought. If the suit is one in which legal rights are to
be ascertained and determined, the Seventh Amendment applies
regardless of the procedure chosen to bring suit. 44
H.R. 5794 allows for considerable procedural flexibility in
bringing the contribution action. The claim may be raised by
cross-claim, counterclaim, or impleader, or in a separate action.
Consider those situations where the plaintiff in the original an-
titrust suit chooses to proceed against some violators and the
contribution issue is raised by cross-claim. The issue of joint
liability must be litigated first because a contribution claim does
not accrue until there has been a finding of joint or concurrent
liability. 45 But the joint liability issue is usually a major part of
the plaintiff's case. To establish a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act it must be shown that the defendant conspired to
engage in anticompetitive conduct. Because this is a legal issue,
defendants would be afforded the right to a jury determination.
Consider next the case where only one of the conspirators is
sued by the plaintiff. Suppose neither party demands a jury and
the court determines that there has been a violation of the
antitrust laws. The defendant, after satisfying the judgment,
brings suit against the coconspirators for contribution. In the
second suit a finding of joint liability is a critical part of the
plaintiff's case. 46 Can the defending party in this second suit
be denied a trial by jury on this issue? Ross v. Bernhard147
instructs that the right to ajury should be determined according
to the nature of the issue, irrespective of the procedure chosen.
If the second defendant had a right to a jury trial in the case of
a cross-claim, then he should not lose it simply because the
original defendant chose not to implead additional defendants.
After a decision on joint liability is reached, the next issue
for determination is the contribution shares. 48 Although the
'44Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
'45See, e.g. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § l(a) (1955).
'46In order to have a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff in
the second suit must plead and prove that he is entitled to contribution from the
defendant. Thus, the first determination to be made is whether the defendant is a
tortfeasor at all.
147396 U.S. 531 (1970).
'"Under H.R. 5794, the court, in fact, has very little discretion regarding the allocation
method. Subsection 41(f) of the bill prescribes a market share method in price-fixing
cases, and a comparative fault method in all other cases.
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method of allocating shares is a matter for the court to decide, 149
the proportion attributable to each violator could be a jury
question in some circumstances. The most likely situation is
where the allocation method chosen is that of comparative
fault. 50 Fault determination has traditionally been a jury func-
tion. The issues involved in determining fault in the contribution
case are identical to those tried in the main claim. The fact that
the issues are cast in terms of contribution does not alter their
basic nature. If the Ross "nature of the issue" test is interpreted
literally, it would seem that the degree of comparative fault must
be decided by a jury upon demand. With regard to the appor-
tionment of contribution on a pro rata basis, there would be no
need to convene a jury as the calculation would be a simple per
capita division of damages. If the market share formula were
used, structural issues such as product and geographic market
definition would have to be determined. If these types of market
structure issues existed at common law in England in 1791, they
were determined by judges. 151 To the extent that the market
share division cannot be stipulated by the parties, the common-
law tradition strongly indicates that there is no right to a jury
trial on the determination of market shares.
Also relevant to the nature of the remedy is the type of relief
sought. Contribution is a demand for a money judgment. Money
damages are traditionally a remedy granted by common-law
courts. 152 Although money damages are the underlying relief
sought, this is not a conclusive test of whether a jury trial is
constitutionally required, though it does add support to the
proposition.
""This assertion is based upon a two-stage historical analysis of the right to a jury
trial as proposed by Professor Jorde. See Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1981). The history is clear that contri-
bution, as a method of allocating damages, was never a matter of choice for the judge
or jury. If the plaintiff were successful, the defendant would be assessed a pro rata
share or be forced to bear the entire judgment (depending on the time period under
consideration).
UOSubsection 41(f) of H.R. 5794 states in part: "In determining contribution shares
with respect to all other claims, the court shall consider the relative responsibility of
each party for the origination or perpetration of the violation for which damages have
been awarded and the benefits derived therefrom." For an argument favoring the fault
standard, see Sullivan, supra note 5.
U"For a persuasive argument of this point, see Jorde, supra note 149.
152See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S . 189, 196 (1974) ("More important, the relief sought
there-actual and punitive damages-is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts
of law.").
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The final factor to consider is complexity. 53 The central in-
quiry is whether contribution issues add so much complexity to
an antitrust case that a jury could not competently decide it. As
to the finding of joint liability, there appears to be no element
of additional complexity. As described above, these issues must
be litigated in the first instance to a jury in order to establish
liability of any of the defendants. Extending a right to contri-
bution should not add significantly novel litigation issues or
strategies. Similarly, if contribution is based on a pro rata or
market share standard and is decided by the judge, as discussed
above, no increased complexity is added to the jury's burden.
The determination of contribution shares on a comparative
fault basis could, however, add to the complexity. But before
denying a jury trial on these grounds, the trial court should
consider all the available procedural devices that might mitigate
the complexity and weigh the possible results of such proce-
dures against the likelihood that the remaining complexity would
affect the jury's competence to render a rational decision. By
exercising its discretion to invoke the rules of procedure, which
permit separate trials of "any claim, cross-claim, or counter-
claim or third party claims on issues,"' 54 and which permit the
court to isolate issues and claims by submitting special instruc-
tions, verdict forms, or interrogatories to the jury, the trial court
could reduce the complexity of determining relative degrees of
fault. Given judicial experience with comparative fault instruc-
tions and jury forms, the issue of contribution under a relative
fault standard should not be unduly complicated.
E. Retroactive Effect
Two legislative provisions that have been considered by Con-
gress expressly provide for retroactive application of contribu-
tion and claim reduction rights to those cases that are pending
at the time of the bill's enactment. The Senate bills permit
application of its claim reduction features to pending litigation
if the party asserting a contribution or claim reduction right
'"An extensive treatment of the Seventh Amendment problems in complex antitrust
cases is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into
the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980);
Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 43 (1980).
'"FED. R. Civ. P. 21, 42(b), 49(b).
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demonstrates that it would be inequitable not to grant the right
retroactively. The bills further require a special finding of fact
by the trial court on the retroactive application, and state that
settlements and release provisions in settlement agreements
signed before the effective date of the legislation shall not be
disturbed. 5 H.R. 4072 simply provides that it shall apply to
pending actions except where application "would result in man-
ifest injustice. ' 156 The remaining proposals do not contain any
provisions concerning the retroactive or prospective application
of contribution and claim reduction rights. 157
Before examining these bills to determine whether applying
them retroactively would be unconstitutional, it may be helpful
to consider discrete applications of the legislation. Initially, the
claim reduction mechanism could reduce the total amount of
damages that an antitrust plaintiff may recover against defen-
dants. This situation would arise where the plaintiff settles with
certain defendants, expecting to recover fully treble the actual
damages proven at trial from the nonsettling defendants, 58 and
"'5See S. REp. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); G. BELL, supra note 48, at 19.
"56H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(e) (1981).
" 
7rhere are essentially two issues: the effect of the statutory language in S. 380 and
H.R. 4072, and the absence of any legislative indication in the remaining provisions
concerning retroactive or prospective application.
The general rules that appear to operate in this area of constitutional concern are
relatively indeterminate and are merely presumptive guidelines. Congress can, for ex-
ample, provide that its legislation shall be applicable to pending cases, and such a
provision is entitled to considerable weight. Further, in the absence of a statement that
the legislation shall be prospectively applied, a statute may be applied to pending cases.
See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Eikenberry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632
(D.C. Cir. 1981). Notwithstanding the congressional determination, however, the federal
courts must always review specific instances of retroactive application for "manifest
injustice." Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717.
Although the condemnation of retroactively applied legislation is not specifically
articulated in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Contract Clause
of Article I, Section 10 and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments as prohibiting retroactive application of legislation in certain situations.
See Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation,
73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693-95 (1960). The Contract Clause, however, applies only to
actions of the states.
"'Under current standards a plaintiff in a private action is entitled to recover treble
the actual damages demonstrated at trial less an offset from the trebled damages figure
for any sums received in settlement. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401
U.S. 321, 348 (1971); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 835 (1957); Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 320 F. Supp. 445 (D.
Okla. 1970).
In the recent case of Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380 (4th Cir.
1982), the court carefully examined the history of and justification for the rule that
settlement payments are deducted after trebling actual damages, and concluded that the
statutory history of section 4 of the Clayton Act and its underlying goals of deterrence
and compensation for injured parties did not countenance claim reduction. Id. at 391-
92.
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the court orders a reduction in the plaintiff's recovery by treble
the settling defendants' market share. 5 9 Because the plaintiff
loses the amount of the "carve out," the plaintiff's expectations
are defeated.
A second, although less likely, situation involving retroactiv-
ity problems concerns a disruption of settlement agreements
where a plaintiff and some defendants settle for a stated figure
and subsequently attempt to rescind the settlement agreement
because the settlement figure was "inordinate" in light of the
contribution legislation.160 Although the right to rescind a settle-
ment agreement for this type of mistake is unclear,'6 t such a
recission would require judicial consideration of the settling
parties' claim that the policy behind the amendatory legislation
is more important than the narrow interests of the contracting
parties. The requirement that settling defendants involve them-
selves in the contribution and claim reduction phase of the case
when they clearly expected to be released from the litigation
raises similar issues. Although some or all of the information
necessary to determine market shares and carve outs may al-
ready be in the possession of nonsettling defendants at the time
of the settlements, it seems probable that settling parties cannot
avoid further involvement in the contribution phase. 62
159The contribution and claim reduction legislation under study commonly provides
that in the event of prelitigation settlement, the plaintiff's claim for damages shall be
reduced by the greatest of the stipulated amount, the consideration paid for settlement,
or treble the actual damages attributable to the settling party's market share. See S. 380,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1983); H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1981).
"'For example, a defendant may enter into a settlement agreement for more than its
proportionate share as determined under the market share or other formulas advanced
by the contribution legislation. More frequently, however, a plaintiff may attempt to
rescind a settlement agreement because of the effect of a subsequent carve out.
The drafters of S. 995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), (now S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983)), anticipated this problem and provided, in subsection 41(f)(2), that settlements
reached in pending cases may not be overturned or disturbed in any way. S. REP. No.
359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1982). It is clear that this provision is intended only to
protect settling defendants against relitigation. The plaintiff still will-suffer the effects
of a reduction of his or her judgment, probably in the amount of treble the settlement
amount. Id. at 51 (supplemental views of Sens. Metzenbaum and Kennedy); see also
G. BELL, supra note 48, at 18-19.
"6'See, e.g., G. BELL, supra note 48, at 18 (commercial frustration).
16-'The degree of involvement in post-settlement proceedings by settling defendants
will depend upon a number of factors, such as the type of goods bought or sold, the
pricing methodology for the goods, the settling defendants' complicity in the cartel, and
the duration and complexity of the conspiracy. See S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 28 (1982). This is precisely the sort of situation that the drafters of S. 380 have
attempted to consider in protecting settling defendants from the risk of relitigation. See
supra note 160.
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Finally, the courts may be presented with arguments from
impleaded defendants in pending cases that the amendatory
legislation created new rights of action against them.163 Although
this argument has more particular reference to the statute of
limitation feature of contribution legislation than to the right of
action feature, 164 it appears that such impleaded defendants may
claim that the effect of legislation is to permit the assertion of
new causes of action in the pending litigation.
The principal flaw in the retroactive application of legislation
is that it impinges upon fundamental notions of the primacy of
private expectations--either in the marketplace or as it affects
individual freedoms-and public fairness-the notion that the
government will be impartial in its dealings with its citizens and
will provide neutral processes to implement impartial norms.165
It is equally clear, however, that there may be public norms and
interests that transcend the more secular concerns of individual
expectations in due process and economic liberty. 166 Therefore,
the Supreme Court has held that civil legislation may be retro-
spectively applied unless to do so would result in a clear con-
stitutional violation. 167
In a recent examination of the due process constraints on
retroactive application of legislation, the Court structured the
balancing analysis by requiring consideration of three factors:
"(a) the nature and identity of the parties, (b) the nature of their
63For example, suppose a plaintiff files an antitrust action in 1979 against some
coconspirators in a cartel. The plaintiff recovers a judgment against the named con-
spirators, but, prior to satisfaction of the judgment, a contribution and claim reduction
bill is passed giving the named conspirators a right of action against the unnamed parties.
In such a situation the named defendants would be entitled to file an action against the
unnamed coconspirators seeking contribution. Cf. Professional Beauty Supply v. Na-
tional Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
"AFor example, suppose a contribution and claim reduction bill is enacted one year
after the defendant pays the judgment. The issue is whether or not the antitrust defendant
may file a new action against a coconspirator who avoided the earlier litigation and
assert a right to contribution.
Only three contribution proposals, H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), Discussion
Draft No. 1, supra note 57, and Discussion Draft No. 2, supra note 60, articulate a
statute of limitations for asserting a contribution claim. The absence of statutory limi-
tation provisions in the remaining bills presents substantive and procedural questions
concerning the applicability of state law analogues to contribution claims and repose in
antitrust cases. See Jacobson, supra note 5, at 240-41. Clearly, responsible legislative
action would include a clear and short statute of limitations for the assertion of contri-
bution claims.
1'Hochman, supra note 157, at 692-97.
'L. TRIaE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-1 (1978).
167See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Welch v. Henry,
305 U.S. 134 (1938).
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rights, and (c) the nature of the impact of the change in law
upon those rights."'1  The nature of the parties, according to
the Court, contemplates an assessment of the parties' status,
incentives and ability to litigate, and, if they are private parties,
whether or not they are attempting to vindicate public poli-
cies. 169 Thus, for example, where private parties attempt to
vindicate rights under statutes proclaimed for their "great na-
tional concern," considerable weight should be placed on the
side of retrospective application of the statute. 7 0
In considering the nature of the preenactment rights, the
Court has indicated its reluctance to retroactively apply statu-
tory provisions where it would deprive parties of rights that had
"matured or become unconditional.'' Although this seems to
contemplate the attachment of analytic importance to largely
archaic notions of vested property rights, this inquiry looks both
to whether or not the legislation in question attempts to fulfill
or deny the parties' expectations and to the degree to which the
parties' expectations have been realized.17 2 For example, in
Bradley v. School Board,173 the plaintiff class of school children
sued the local school board to compel desegregation of the
public school system, and requested attorneys' fees under a
federal statute. After pointing out that the plaintiffs were vin-
dicating important matters of national policy, the Court stated
"'Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 717 (1974). See generally Hochman, supra
note 157.
169Bradley, 416 U.S. at 717-18.
1701d. at 719 (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110
(1801)).
1i'1d. at 720.
172Id.; see also Hochman, supra note 157, at 717-26.
In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court
considered a due process attack on federal black lung legislation that would have
imposed certain financial responsibilities on coal mining firms for black lung benefits
claimed by former employees. The mine operators complained that imposition of liability
was impermissible because they could not have anticipated the imposition of liability at
the time of employment. Id. at 15. The Court held that notwithstanding the possible
reliance on the existing state of the law by the mine operators, retroactive application
of legislation was "justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees'
disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor-the operators and
the coal consumers." Id. at 18.
A similar method of analysis is used under the Contract Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 10. Contracting parties, as a general rule, are entitled to rely on the law as it exists
at the time of contracting. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n y. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429-
30 (1934). However, the legislature may vary or otherwise impair the substantive or
remedial provisions of law that are relied upon by contracting parties where the legis-
lative modification serves a legitimate public purpose. United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1977).
173416 U.S. 696, 720 (1974).
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that the school board, which was appealing the retroactive ap-
plication of the federal statute, had no "matured or uncondi-
tional right" in the fund provided by taxpayers.1 74 According to
the Court, the funds from which the attorneys' fees would be
paid "were essentially held in trust for the public" and the school
board "was subject to such conditions or instructions on the use
of the funds as the public wished to make through its duly
elected representatives. 1 ' 75
The third consideration, the influence of the change of law
upon existing rights, concerns the degree to which retroactive
application affects the parties' expectations and obligations,
their opportunities for notice and a hearing, and the likelihood
that the parties relied to their detriment on the preenactment
state of affairs. 76 The closer the statutory provision comes to
extinguishing the substance of a preexisting right, the less likely
the statute is to be constitutional.177
The contribution bills that apply to pending cases present
challenging questions of constitutionality. First, the plaintiffs
are vindicating important governmental concerns by serving as
private attorneys general. 178 Plaintiffs also will lose preexisting
rights concerning the management of the litigation and the
amount of the recovery. To the extent that settling defendants
and newly impleaded defendants contend that retroactive appli-
cation of contribution rights impair their rights under preenact-
ment law, it seems that neither their status as antitrust wrong-
doers nor their asserted interests provide compelling
justifications for refusing retrospective application. 179 Similarly,
1
74Id.
1751d.
176Id. at 720-21; see also Hochman, supra note 157, at 711-17.
177Hochman, supra note 157, at 712.178Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
'79Cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976).
The confluence between the status of the party asserting the right to statutory benefits
and permissible governmental purposes was demonstrated in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
396 U.S. 13 (1969). The plaintiff sued, claiming that the defendant's consignment agree-
ments violated section 1 of the Sherman Act as a form of price-fixing. The Supreme
Court agreed. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). In that decision, the Court
reserved "the question whether, when all facts are known, there may be any equities
that would warrant only prospective application in damage suits of the rule governing
price-fixing by consignment device which we announce today." Id. at 24-25. On remand,
the district court held that the rule announced in the Supreme Court's decision should
be given prospective application because the defendant had a "reasonable basis for
believing its actions were entirely lawful." 396 U.S. at 14. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "[t]he question we reserved was not an invitation to deny the fruits of
1983]
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an impleaded defendant cannot readily demonstrate any ma-
tured rights or expectations of immunity from suit for its com-
plicity in an antitrust violation.
Settling parties, however, such as antitrust plaintiffs and de-
fendants, may well have legitimate expectations as a result of a
negotiated settlement, and more particularly, those parties may
rely on the state of the law at the time they entered into their
agreement. 180 It is further likely that retrospective application
of the contribution bill will disrupt settled contractual and sub-
stantive obligations where a claim reduction provision requires
a diminution of a plaintiff's prospect for damages and requires
further involvement by settling parties in the contribution phase
of the case.'18 In balancing the effects of a carve out on plaintiffs'
expectations and on disruptions of settlement agreements
against legislative purposes, it is clear that application of the
claim reduction provisions to pending cases will not advance
the deterrence function of the statute because the illegal conduct
already has occurred. Moreover, retrospective application will
frustrate legitimate compensatory interests of antitrust plaintiffs
and endanger expectancy interests in settlement agreements.
Therefore, retroactive application of the contribution provi-
sions to newly impleaded defendants will not present any sub-
stantial questions of unconstitutionality. Settling defendants
who claim that the claim reduction provision is unconstitutional
because it requires their additional effort in the contribution
successful litigation to this petitioner. Congress has determined the causes of action
that arise from antitrust violations; and there has been an adjudication that a cause of
action against respondent has been established." Id.
11OAs previously discussed, the reasonableness of plaintiffs' reliance is directly related
to the permissibility of their expectations, the duration of the belief, and the legitimate
government objective. See supra notes 172 & 179. In the case of contribution legislation,
the objectives of the antitrust laws militate against retroactive application of the con-
tribution legislation where such an application will disrupt previously negotiated settle-
ments and will require settling defendants to participate in the relitigation of issues
concerning contribution rights and shares. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying
text.
181S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), attempts to amelioriate some of the impact of
the claim reduction provision on settling plaintiffs by providing procedural requirements
in a claim reduction hearing and by imposing the burden of demonstrating the propriety
and fairness of claim reduction orthe nonsettling defendant requesting claim reduction.
S. 380, § 41(f)(1). The provision ofhearing rights and due process standards is important
in considering the constitutionality of retroactively applied legislation. L. TRIBE, supra
note 166, § 10-1, at 476. However, in many situations, if not most, the effect of retro-
active application will be to deprive antitrust plaintiffs of damages which they expected
to receive and which provided the statutory incentive to litigate, as contemplated by
the private right of action in section 4 of the Clayton Act. In the face of such a blatant
infringement on the substantive rights accorded under preenactment law, the right to a
hearing is small solace.
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phase of the case may be successful if they demonstrate that
their further involvement in the case was unanticipated and will
be substantial. However, the claim reduction provisions will be
unconstitutional where plaintiffs suffer carve outs from their
damages, or where previously negotiated settlement agreements
are substantially impaired by claim reduction principles. The
rather intricate provisions in S. 380, particularly those creating
a right to a hearing, cannot remedy the unconstitutionality of
applying claim reduction to these situations. 8 2
V. CONCLUSION
This Article considers the form that contribution and claim
reduction legislation is taking and various implications of that
form; it has not considered the propriety of a contribution
rule.'83 The conclusion is that Congress, in considering any
proposal for contribution and claim reduction, must give careful
thought to the effect of the legislation on antitrust policy and
practice, including fairness, deterrence, and transaction costs.
These fundamental antitrust objectives and economic conse-
quences are implicated in each of the pending proposals. When
these considerations are evaluated in the context of each of the
proposals, substantial flaws are discovered. The relative weights
assigned and importance given to these values have varied
throughout the judicial decisionmaking process. As Congress
contemplates the pending legislation, it must resolve the con-
flicts between these goals. In balancing the values and compet-
itive effects of the legislation, Congress can bring clarity to the
law.
It is our firm conviction that if Congress adopts a position
favoring contribution, then it should recognize distinctions in
the severity of the proscribed activity and the actors' conduct
in the conspiracy. The preferable approach of adopting a con-
tribution rule should be recognized in cases involving rule of
reason analysis, where there are no "bright line" demarcations
'
82Cf. G. BELL, supra note 48, at 23 (concluding that "a better solution would be to
leave the proposed legislation silent with respect to its applicability"),
'
83The authors have reached different conclusions concerning the merits of a contri-
bution rule vis-a-vis a no-contribution rule. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of
1979: Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 142 (1979) (statement
of Donald J. Polden); Sullivan, supra note 5.
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between acceptable and proscribed conduct and where the an-
ticompetitive nature of the challenged conduct is equivocal.184
Contribution rights should not be accorded in traditional per
se offenses, such as horizontal price-fixing. Denying the right
of contribution in such cases would best serve the deterrence
objectives of the law. Little justification exists for allowing an
antitrust violator to recover contribution from others where his
conduct is anticompetitive. Similarly, the invocation of contri-
bution should be within the trial court's discretion so that an
economically influential violator cannot escape liability through
coercion, collusion, or the plaintiff's caprice. The relative bar-
gaining power of the wrongdoers and the extent of their partic-
ipation in the illegal conduct are highly relevant in determining
the propriety of contribution on a case-by-case basis. In these
respects, the bills considered by the House are flawed, partic-
ularly those recognizing a right to contribution only in horizontal
price-fixing cases.
Should Congress adopt a procontribution approach, it will
need to resolve the method of apportioning liability and of de-
termining the respective contribution shares. A pro rata basis,
while clearly the easiest to administer, suffers from the same
unfairness that results from a no-contribution rule, in that each
violator would bear an equal share of the damages without
regard to its relative participation in or benefits from the pro-
scribed conduct. In this respect, deterrence also would be di-
luted, because the severity of the punishment would be appor-
tioned equally. For the same reasons, a "market share" standard
does not advance deterrence objectives, because the market
share data are not necessarily related to complicity in the anti-
trust violation and are likely to raise problems of complexity.
Contribution on the basis of relative responsibility may be the
most appropriate method of computing contribution rights and
claim reduction, though it is perhaps the most complicated
method proposed. Its value lies in elimination of the inequities
caused by the no-contribution approach, while at the same time
it recognizes distinctions in the severity of proscribed behavior
and the relative culpability of each antitrust violator. In contrast
to pro rata or market share standards, it may protect less culp-
able defendants with relatively slight economic power from dam-
184See Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 367-68; Sullivan, supra note
5, at 417, 421.
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age exposure that does not correspond to the extent of partici-
pation in the illegal conduct. It also furthers the policy of the
antitrust laws by predicating severity of liability on the extent
of the responsibility for the proscribed activity. In doing so, it
adds a measure of certainty and predictability to the application
of a contribution rule. Although it may significantly affect liti-
gation strategies, counseling methods, and settlement negotia-
tion, a comparative contribution rule may best advance the
policies underlying the law. The deterrent goals of certainty and
severity of punishment will be advanced within the context of
contribution, while some unfairness caused by the no-contri-
bution tradition will be eliminated.
Before Congress adopts a position against the right to a jury
trial on the contribution issue, it needs to consider the pre-
merger custom, the remedy sought, and the ability of juries to
rationally decide contribution issues. Historical research on
these issues does not suggest a clear resolution, although it
would seem to favor a discretionary approach by the trial court
in weighing the relevant factors in each instance. The historical
development of the Seventh Amendment right indicates that in
determining contribution shares the right to a jury trial lacks
historical precedent when the means used to reallocate the lia-
bility is based on a pro rata or market share determination.
Stronger arguments are available for the invocation of jury trials
when the damage distribution is based on relative degrees of
fault.
Finally, the bills present real issues of constitutional adequacy
with respect to attempts to make claim reduction principles
applicable to pending antitrust cases. Current constitutional
analysis strongly suggests that retrospective application of the
claim reduction features will be unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause where settlements entered into before the effec-
tive date of the legislation are disrupted and where settlement
carve outs reduce plaintiffs' settlement expectations, as condi-
tioned by preenactment law. More important, however, is the
notion that the primary objectives of the proposed legislation-
enhanced deterrence and greater fairness and balance in com-
pensatory goals-will be fairly and efficiently advanced by pro-
spective application, and not by retrospective windfalls to de-
fendants in a few pending cases.
The model legislation that follows addresses the concerns
expressed in this Article. It attempts to advance the antitrust
1983]
HeinOnline  -- 20 Harv. J. on Legis. 437 1983
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 20:397
objectives of deterrence, compensation, and fairness, in the
context of traditional concepts of proof, and weighs those fac-
tors against transaction costs and complexity. It rejects a right
of contribution in horizontal price-fixing cases, as envisioned
under H.R. 4072, H.R. 1242, H.R. 5794, S. 995, and Discussion
Drafts Nos. 1 and 2. Contribution, moreover, is not permitted
under the proposal for antitrust conduct that is per se unlawful,
as in classic cartel-like conduct, but rather only where the con-
duct is scrutinized under a rule of reason analysis. A further
limitation places discretion in the trial court as to the invocation
of the right to contribution. Finally, should the trial court invoke
its discretion in the apportionment of damages, the model leg-
islation would require contribution shares to be determined on
a relative fault standard. In no event is the model legislation
intended to alter the substantive antitrust law.
A BILL
To amend the Clayton Act to establish a right of contribution with respect
to damages in certain actions brought under such Act.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
That the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1980)) is amended by
inserting after section 4H the following new section:
"SEC. 41. (a) Any person who is liable for damages in an action
brought under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act may claim contribution,
in accordance with this section, from any other person jointly liable for
such damages.
"(b) A claim for contribution may be asserted by crossclaim, counter-
claim, or third-party claim in the same action as that in respect of which
contribution rights are claimed, or in a separate action, whether an
action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered against the
person from whom contribution is sought.
"(c) A claim for contribution shall be forever barred unless filed within
six months after the entry of the final judgment for which contribution
is sought.
"(d) Contribution may not be claimed by or from a person who,
pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into in good faith with a
plaintiff in the action in respect of which contribution rights are claimed,
has been released from liability or potential liability for the underlying
claim.
"(e) Rights to contribution granted under subsection (a) shall be within
the discretion of the trial court.
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"(f) In any action under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act, the court
shall reduce the claim of any person releasing any person from liability
or potential liability for damages by the greatest of-
"(1) any amount stipulated for this purpose;
"(2) the amount of the consideration paid for the release; or
"(3) the contribution share of the person released.
"(g) (1) With respect to claims based upon horizontal per se violations,
or price-fixing, contribution within this section shall not be
permitted.
"(2) In determining contribution shares with respect to all other
claims, the court shall consider the relative responsibility of each
party for the origination or perpetration of and participation in
the violation for which damages have been awarded and the
benefits derived therefrom.
"(h) Nothing in this section should be construed to deny any person
the right to a jury trial otherwise permitted for a claim asserted under
subsection (a).
"(i) Nothing in this section shall affect the joint and several liability
of any person.
"(j) This section shall apply only to actions under section 4, 4A, or 4C
of this Act commenced after the date of enactment of this section.
"(k) The enactment of this section shall not invalidate any settlement
entered before the date of this section's enactment, whether or not
approved by the court."
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